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KIOBEL AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY: HERE, 
(NOT) THERE, (NOT EVEN) EVERYWHERE 
EDWARD T. SWAINE* 
Title notwithstanding, the Beatles’ “Here, There and Everywhere” is 
relentlessly local.1 The object of affection is wanted everywhere, just so 
long as it’s next to Paul: the song could have been called “Here,” but the 
chorus would have suffered. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.2 
was also relentlessly, and unexpectedly, local in character. Notwithstanding 
the global outlook suggested by the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which 
governs civil actions by “an alien” for torts contrary to “the law of nations 
or a treaty of the United States,”3 the Court invoked the presumption 
against extraterritoriality to limit the statute’s reach.4 Several years later, 
and notwithstanding the Court’s subsequent instruction in RJR Nabisco, 
Inc. v. European Community,5 courts and commentators still struggle to 
find its governing principle—and, for those trying to put the ATS to some 
use, that limiting principle’s own metes and bounds. 
There was, as always, a silver lining for advocates of the ATS. Many 
suppose a frontier remains open given the majority’s cryptic suggestion that 
ATS claims may “touch and concern the territory of the United States . . . 
with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial 
application.”6 Others note Justice Kennedy’s pronouncement, in his 
concurrence, that future cases might require future opinions—the equivalent 
of declaring terra incognita, though in this case due more to the 
cartographer’s indecision than to any dearth of information about the 
terrain.7 Still others took heart in Justice Breyer’s concurrence in the 
* Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. This Article is based
on remarks delivered at the University of Oklahoma Law School in October 2015, but 
updated to reflect the subsequent decision in RJR Nabisco v. European Community, 136 S. 
Ct. 2090 (2016).  I would like to thank Alden DiIanni-Morton for excellent research 
assistance. 
1. THE BEATLES, REVOLVER (Capitol Records 1990) (1966). But then there’s THE
BEATLES, Across the Universe, on LET IT BE (Abbey Road 1970). 
2. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
4. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665.
5. 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016).
6. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
7. Id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Other cases may arise with allegations of
serious violations of international law principles protecting persons, cases covered neither by 
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judgment, for himself and three others, that would have taken territory into 
account—not as part of the presumption against extraterritoriality—but not 
determinatively, where other features implicated American equities.8 The 
result was that additional factors, like wrongdoing by American nationals 
(or domiciliaries),9 or other interests,10 might permit the statute to reach 
overseas conduct. 
Naturally, ATS skeptics view Kiobel differently. Many of those 
concerned about the use of U.S. courts to address foreign controversies—
including some of those courts themselves—welcomed the result and took a 
broader view of the majority’s implications for future cases.11 Those 
looking for absolutes tended to embrace Justice Alito’s concurrence, which 
would have given bite to the presumption by suggesting that claims 
touching and concerning anywhere else fall outside the statute—to critics, 
something painfully close to asserting that the “there” excluded from the 
ATS is nearly “everywhere.”12 
This Article tries to determine which reading of Kiobel is best and which 
is likely to prevail—having benefit, in the latter regard at least, of RJR 
Nabisco, but handicapped by heightened uncertainty about the Court’s 
composition.13 Kiobel was a 5-4 decision, with the late Justice Scalia siding 
with the majority14—meaning that Justice Breyer’s concurrence in the 
                                                                                                                 
the [Torture Victim Protection Act] nor by the reasoning and holding of today’s case; and in 
those disputes the proper implementation of the presumption against extraterritorial 
application may require some further elaboration and explanation.”). 
 8. Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 9. See, e.g., Doug Cassel, Suing Americans for Human Rights Torts Overseas: The 
Supreme Court Leaves the Door Open, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1773, 1775-76 (2014) 
(focusing on nationality). 
 10. See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, The Kiobel Presumption and Extraterritoriality, 52 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 8 (2013) (reviewing possibilities).  
 11. See, e.g., Julian Ku & John Yoo, The Supreme Court Unanimously Rejects Universal 
Jurisdiction, FORBES.COM (Apr. 21, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
realspin/2013/04/21/the-supreme-court-unanimously-rejects-universal-jurisdiction/#3c6d131 
b4af5. 
 12. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669-70 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[A] putative ATS cause of 
action will fall within the scope of the presumption against extraterritoriality—and will 
therefore be barred—unless the domestic conduct is sufficient to violate an international law 
norm that satisfies Sosa's requirements of definiteness and acceptance among civilized 
nations.”). 
 13. At the time of the symposium, the late Justice Scalia was still serving on the Court 
and the petition for certiorari in RJR Nabisco had just been granted; at the time this Article 
was finalized, no replacement had been confirmed. 
 14. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659.  
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judgment had as much support among those now serving on the Court as 
Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion did—and RJR Nabisco was a 4-3 
decision (rendered after Justice Scalia’s passing) in which Justice 
Sotomayor, who had sided with Justice Breyer in Kiobel, recused herself.15 
If one takes the decisions as written, and assumes that the Court will follow 
issues resolved in them on the basis of stare decisis, how can we expect the 
Court would resolve a subsequent matter concerning extraterritoriality and 
the ATS? 
Unsurprisingly, given its title, this Article puts a heavy emphasis on 
territoriality—not, it should be stressed, as a matter of normative 
preference, but purely as a reflection of the Court’s recent cases. It is 
accordingly inconsistent with some of the more expansive readings of the 
ATS, though it stops short of Justice Alito’s prescription. If future cases are 
to depart substantially from territoriality, the better path is not to explore 
what Kiobel left unresolved, but to revisit what it purported to settle. 
I. Invoking the Presumption 
Kiobel migrated from being a case about whether the ATS permitted 
corporate liability16 to one concerning “[w]hether and under what 
circumstances the [ATS] allows courts to recognize a cause of action for 
violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign 
other than the United States”17—or, as the Chief Justice Roberts put it in 
the majority opinion, “[W]hether a claim may reach conduct occurring in 
the territory of a foreign sovereign.”18  
Not slow on the uptake, respondents thereafter emphasized the 
presumption against extraterritoriality (more exactly, “the presumption 
                                                                                                                 
 15. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016).  
 16. The petition for certiorari sought review of whether corporations were liable like 
other private party defendants for violations of the law of nations, and the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari without changing the questions presented. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011) (Mem.); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kiobel, 132 S. 
Ct. 472 (2011) (No. 10-1491). In its decision on the merits, the Court said it had formerly 
been addressing the question of the lower court’s decision that “the law of nations does not 
recognize corporate liability”—fair, so far as it goes, but certainly shifting to the 
international law question, and indicating that it had ultimately decided to bypass that. 
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663. 
 17. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (Mem.) (citation 
omitted).  
 18. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664. 
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against extraterritorial application”).19 That presumption, as the Court had 
explained not long before Kiobel, meant that “[w]hen a statute gives no 
clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”20 The 
presumption’s rationale varied. Early on, the concern was that 
extraterritoriality might violate the law of nations: since statutes were not to 
be construed to violate international law if it could be avoided, 
extraterritorial application would not be presumed.21 A second rationale 
was “to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of 
other nations which could result in international discord.”22 Such a clash 
might be intended; the key is to avoid having the judiciary make the choice 
for the United States.23 Third, the canon reflected “[t]he presumption that 
United States law governs domestically but does not rule the world”24—
because, irrespective of any clash with foreign law, Congress “is primarily 
concerned with domestic conditions.”25  
Kiobel followed other recent cases in neglecting the first rationale, 
concerning compatibility with international law;26 this was consistent, as 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Id. (explaining policies behind “the presumption against extraterritorial 
application”). Similar phrasing was employed throughout Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 
561 U.S. 247 (2010), the leading case prior to Kiobel. 
 20. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255; see also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 
U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“It is a longstanding principle of American law ‘that legislation of 
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States.’” (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 
(1949))). 
 21. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“Though it clearly has constitutional authority to do so, Congress is generally 
presumed not to have exceeded those customary international-law limits on jurisdiction to 
prescribe.”). See generally John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 
AM. J. INT’L L. 351, 352 (2010) (proposing “a presumption that federal law does not extend 
beyond the jurisdictional limits set by international law”). 
 22. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248. 
 23. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957) (“For us to run 
interference in . . . a delicate field of international relations there must be present the 
affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed. It alone has the facilities necessary 
to make fairly such an important policy decision where the possibilities of international 
discord are so evident and retaliative action so certain.”).  
 24. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007). 
 25. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (quoting Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285). In Morrison, the 
Court made clear that the clash highlighted in Aramco was not a prerequisite. Morrison, 561 
U.S. at 255 (citing Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 173-74 (1993)); see also 
RJR Nabisco, Inc., v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016). 
 26. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267 (“We know of no one who thought that the Act was 
intended to ‘regulat[e]’ foreign securities exchanges—or indeed who even believed that 
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noted below, with the Court’s informal presumption that questions of 
international law are usually best skirted. (Certainly one might expect that it 
would be unenthusiastic about ducking Kiobel’s original inquiry, involving 
difficult appraisals of the international law on corporate liability, only to 
grapple with international conundrums concerning jurisdiction.) Kiobel did 
rely to at least some degree on the second and third rationales.27 And it 
described a fourth, slightly broader one: “[E]nsur[ing] that the Judiciary 
does not erroneously adopt an interpretation of U.S. law that carries foreign 
policy consequences not clearly intended by the political branches.”28 This 
reinforced the idea that foreign policy consequences other than clashes 
between U.S. and foreign law might animate the presumption. Taken 
seriously, it might also justify invoking the presumption when there was 
room to doubt the assumption (integral to the third rationale) that Congress 
was “primarily concerned with domestic conditions”—as when, say, the 
statute’s topic was the law of nations.  
The Court described such rationales largely by way of background, 
rather than suggesting that one or more must be met each time the 
presumption is applied to a particular statute. Even when it related them to 
the ATS,29 it was for a special reason: as the Court conceded, the 
presumption was “typically appl[ied] . . . to discern whether an Act of 
Congress regulating conduct applies abroad,”30 and it had previously 
determined in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain that the ATS was a “‘strictly 
jurisdictional’” statute that did not “directly regulate conduct or afford 
relief.”31 Nevertheless, the Court thought that “the principles underlying the 
                                                                                                                 
under established principles of international law Congress had the power to do so.” 
(alteration in original)). 
 27. See, as to the second rationale, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 
1659, 1664 (2013) (first quoting Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248; then quoting Benz, 353 U.S. at 
147) as to the second rationale. See id. (quoting Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 454). The third 
rationale was less conspicuous, though Justice Breyer attributed it to the Kiobel majority. 
See id. at 1672 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).  
 28. Id. at 1664 (majority opinion). The Court also discussed objections by foreign states 
to extraterritorial application of the ATS, as well as a scenario in which foreign states would 
feel at liberty to apply similar approaches to conduct of U.S. citizens. See id. at 1669. 
 29. Id. at 1664-65, 1667, 1669. 
 30. Id. at 1664.  
 31. Id. (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004)). 
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canon of interpretation similarly constrain courts considering causes of 
action that may be brought under the ATS.”32 
Still, applying the presumption to jurisdictional statutes was 
controversial. To minimize the novelty, one could seize on this reference in 
Kiobel to the constraint of the “principles underlying” the presumption, as 
opposed to the constraints of the presumption itself.33 Yet no such 
distinction seems to have been intended, since the Court concluded that “the 
presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS.”34 
And nothing in its subsequent decision in RJR Nabisco suggested 
otherwise. There, the Court not only recalled Kiobel’s reasoning,35 but 
added that the presumption against territoriality required rebuttal 
“regardless of whether the statute in question regulates conduct, affords 
relief, or merely confers jurisdiction.”36  
To be sure, despite what the Court said, there’s reason to resist the idea 
that the presumption generally applies to jurisdictional statutes, as opposed 
to causes of action implied under a jurisdictional statute.37 Perhaps future 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Id. After discussing said principles, the Court confirmed that the presumption 
applied to the ATS. Id. at 1665 (“The principles underlying the presumption against 
extraterritoriality thus constrain courts exercising their power under the ATS.”). 
 33. Cf. Eugene Kontorovich, Kiobel Surprise: Unexpected by Scholars but Consistent 
with International Trends, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1671, 1687-89 (2014) (suggesting, more 
generally, that the Court applied a presumption against universality, as opposed to one 
against extraterritoriality). 
 34. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. The Court went on to address whether, “even if the 
presumption applies,” it may yet be rebutted. Id. at 1665. As discussed below, moreover, the 
Court found “nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption” and that the claims concerned 
did not “displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.” Id. at 1669. The Court 
also dispensed for the most part with discussing the principles underlying the presumption 
and considered the presumption directly. See id. at 1666, 1669. This did not mean the Court 
avoided discussing the underlying rationale. See id. at 1668 (adverting to “the weighty 
concerns underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality”). 
 35. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100-01 (2016). 
 36. Id. at 2101. 
 37. A point stressed by William Dodge, who notes how RJR Nabisco and prior cases 
like Morrison appeared to focus on the substantive statutes at issue rather than the 
underlying jurisdictional ones, and who suggests that the hazards of extending the 
presumption to general jurisdiction statutes (like 28 U.S.C. § 1331) mean that the Court 
could not have intended to encompass jurisdictional statutes generally. William S. Dodge, 
The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Still Does Not Apply to Jurisdictional Statutes, 
OPINIO JURIS (July 1, 2016, 4:57 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2016/07/01/32658/; William S. 
Dodge, The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Does Not Apply to Jurisdictional 
Statutes, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 28, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/01/28/guest-
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cases will draw sub-categorical distinctions among types of jurisdictional 
statutes, or perhaps inquire (as in Kiobel) whether the policies behind the 
presumption are served before assessing jurisdictional statutes, or perhaps it 
will consider the presumption to be non-jurisdictional in character even 
when bearing on jurisdictional statutes.38 For ATS purposes, at least, RJR 
Nabisco indicated that the jurisdictional nature of that particular statute 
made no difference, and further portended that “certain applications of [a] 
statute” might trigger a separate application of the presumption—in the case 
of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), 
requiring examination not only the predicate offenses, but also the 
substantive provisions of RICO itself and its remedial provisions.39  
Having disregarded the potential distinctiveness of jurisdictional statutes, 
Kiobel also showed little interest in drawing lines based on other 
jurisdictional questions.40 Although it has been said that Kiobel rejected 
universal jurisdiction41—leaving territoriality or some other theory as a 
prescriptive basis justifying the ATS under international law—the Court 
exhibited no interest in the question.42 The most that can be said is that, 
given the Court’s truncation of the ATS’s geographic reach, the ATS no 
longer depended on universal jurisdiction. By the same token, Kiobel made 
clear, if it were necessary, that the presumption against extraterritoriality 
applies regardless of the particular basis for jurisdiction under constitutional 
or international law.  
As a related matter, the Court was also unreceptive to the argument that 
the nature of the offenses concerned was reason to avoid invoking the 
presumption. As previously, the Court distinguished between 
                                                                                                                 
post-dodge-presumption-extraterritoriality-apply-jurisdictional-statutes/. As noted in the 
text, there may be other possible distinctions. 
 38. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664-65. In Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., the Court 
specifically addressed extraterritoriality as “a merits question” distinct from subject-matter 
jurisdiction. 561 U.S. 247, 253-54 (2010). Since Kiobel, some lower courts have understood 
extraterritoriality to pose a jurisdictional issue in the fullest sense, though it is just one of 
many. See, e.g., Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 179 (2d Cir. 2014) (describing the 
issue as jurisdictional, but not addressing it first, and noting that the order of inquiry among 
jurisdictional questions is a matter of discretion). 
 39. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2100-01. 
 40. It also failed to engage the issue of the constitutional basis for the ATS, variously 
stated to be either the Offenses Clause or Article III’s grant of foreign diversity jurisdiction 
over controversies between U.S. citizens and foreign citizens. 
 41. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum: The Alien Tort 
Statute's Jurisdictional Universalism in Retreat, 2012-2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 149 (2013). 
 42. Justice Breyer, at least, mentioned the issue in passing. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1673, 1676 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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acknowledging the existence of global norms and recognizing a cause of 
action.43 The latter, its ostensible concern, might entail defining the norm, 
indicating who could be liable (a question that probably loomed large, 
given the original issue of corporate liability in Kiobel), establishing 
(potentially) rules of exhaustion and statutes of limitations, and so forth.44 
“Each of these decisions,” the Court stressed, “carrie[d] with it significant 
foreign policy implications.”45 Others, naturally, might say that limiting 
causes of action also had significant policy implications, but the Court’s 
view of the status quo ex ante led it to be less concerned about that.  
II. Rebutting the Presumption 
Assuming the presumption against territoriality is germane—because a 
claim, arising under virtually any kind of statute, entails reaching outside 
the United States—what happens then? As synthesized by the Court in RJR 
Nabisco, the “first step” is to “ask whether the presumption against 
extraterritoriality has been rebutted—that is, whether the statute gives a 
clear, affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially.”46 This burdens 
Congress with the obligation to indicate, somehow, that the relevant 
statutory provision should apply extraterritorially. Kiobel provided an 
example of the provision establishing jurisdiction over genocide, which 
applies “‘regardless of where the offense is committed’ if the alleged 
offender is, among other things, ‘present in the United States.’”47 On the 
other hand, it is not enough for a statute to use indiscriminate language like 
“any” or “every,” as the ATS does in referring to “any civil action.”48 Nor 
does the term “torts” do the trick, even when coupled with the historical 
understanding of transitory torts.49 
The Court accepted that “context,” not just text, might overcome the 
presumption, but took a narrow view of the contextual evidence presented 
to it.50 Of the three offenses the First Congress might have had in mind 
when it enacted the ATS, two (offenses against ambassadors, and violations 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Id. at 1664-66 (majority opinion).  
 44. Id. at 1665. 
 45. Id. 
 46. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016). 
 47. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1091(e) (2006 ed., Supp. V)). 
 48. Id.  
 49. Id. at 1665-66. 
 50. Id. at 1666 (“‘[A]ssuredly context can be consulted’ in determining whether a cause 
of action applies abroad” (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd. 561 U.S. 247, 265) 
(2010))). 
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of safe passage) were fully capable of arising within the United States.51 
The outlier was the third, piracy. If Congress had piracy in mind—which 
does not, by its nature, arise from conduct taking place within the United 
States—how could it not have contemplated extraterritorial application? 
And wasn’t the Court to suppose Congress had done so, given that the 
Court “has generally treated the high seas the same as foreign soil for 
purposes of the presumption”?52  
The Court’s answer was that it was less problematic to apply U.S. law to 
piracy than to “conduct occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of 
another sovereign,” since the latter carried more “direct foreign policy 
consequences.”53 Pirates were distinct, the Court reckoned, as they “were 
fair game wherever found, by any nation, because they generally did not 
operate within any jurisdiction.”54 Congress’ anticipation “of a cause of 
action against them” was not, therefore, “a sufficient basis for concluding 
that other causes of action under the ATS reach conduct that does occur 
within the territory of another sovereign; pirates may well be a category 
unto themselves.”55 
One can dispute the Court’s understanding of how far claims against 
pirates would have been thought to reach, since piracy did plausibly 
implicate conduct taken on foreign shores as well.56 Even if one accepts the 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Id.  
 52. As the Court noted, this meant it had previously declined to construe statutes as 
applying to conduct on the high seas. Id. at 1667 (citing Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 
509 U.S. 155, 173-74 (1993), and Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 
U.S. 428, 440 (1989)). 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. 
 56. See id. at 1667-68. The Court discussed a much-controverted opinion by Attorney 
General William Bradford addressing conduct by U.S. citizens who, as part of a French 
privateer fleet, committed piratical acts against the British colony of Sierra Leone—
notwithstanding American neutrality. Id. at 1667. Explaining U.S. authority to the British 
Ambassador, Attorney General Bradford stated: 
So far . . . as the transactions complained of originated or took place in a 
foreign country, they are not within the cognizance of our courts; nor can the 
actors be legally prosecuted or punished for them by the United States. But 
crimes committed on the high seas are within the jurisdiction of the . . . courts 
of the United States; and, so far as the offence was committed thereon, I am 
inclined to think that it may be legally prosecuted in . . . those courts. . . . But 
some doubt rests on this point, in consequence of the terms in which the 
[applicable criminal law] is expressed. But there can be no doubt that the 
company or individuals who have been injured by these acts of hostility have a 
remedy by a civil suit in the courts of the United States; jurisdiction being 
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Court’s premises, however, its reasoning about the piracy counterexample 
was far from obvious. As Chief Justice Roberts noted, the presumption 
against extraterritoriality applies to each statutory provision, since even 
“[w]hen a statute provides for some extraterritorial application, the 
presumption against extraterritoriality operates to limit that provision to its 
terms.”57 That applies awkwardly to the ATS, since there the selfsame 
statutory provision governing piracy also applies to other offenses. Two 
possible solutions spring to mind. First, one might be forced to generalize 
from the case of piracy to all ATS-cognizable offenses and reckon that the 
ATS was intended to apply outside the United States even if not, 
necessarily, to conduct within other states—a principle of contra-
territoriality. Nothing in the Court’s provision-by-provision approach 
required the further step of recalculating what Congress contemplated for 
every potential action arising under a given provision, so it might be 
enough to conclude that Congress had anticipated some foreign application 
and then apply that inference consistently to other territorial questions 
arising under the same provision.58 Second, and at the other end of the 
spectrum, one might conduct an offense-by-offense reckoning as to whether 
Congress had rebutted the presumption. Unfortunately, Congress left few 
solid clues as to what offenses it had in mind, let alone the proper 
                                                                                                                 
expressly given to these courts in all cases where an alien sues for a tort only, 
in violation of the laws of nations, or a treaty of the United States . . . . 
Id. at 1667-68 (alterations in original) (quoting Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57, 
58-59 (1795)). As the Court noted, the significance turned in part on what Bradford meant 
by “these acts of hostility” subject to civil jurisdiction: in particular, whether he meant them 
to include the acts “originat[ing] or [taking] place in a foreign country” that had been 
definitively excluded from the reach of criminal jurisdiction, or whether they were limited to 
“crimes committed on the high seas,” which he thought were within U.S. criminal 
jurisdiction but on which “some doubt” might remain. Id. The Court declined to rest on his 
opinion, which it noted had been variously interpreted even by the Solicitor General, 
because “it deals with U.S. citizens who, by participating in an attack taking place both on 
the high seas and on a foreign shore, violated a treaty between the United States and Great 
Britain.” Id. at 1668. 
 57. Id. at 1667 (first quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd. 561 U.S. 247, 265 
(2010); then citing Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 455-56 (2007)). 
 58. See 561 U.S. at 264-65, 265 n.8. This would be consistent with the approach 
recently taken by the D.C. Circuit, which reaffirmed that when a substantive offense 
established by statute (in that case, the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act) applied 
extraterritorially, ancillary offenses like conspiracy would as well; extraterritoriality would, 
in other words, be imputed to the offenses arising under a statute with extraterritorial reach 
even if they had not been individually addressed by Congress. United States v. Ballestas, 
795 F.3d 138, 144-45 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
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geographic scope of each, besides (the Court supposed) its awareness of 
three offenses that were prominent in 1789.59 Still, one might try to reckon 
which modern offenses particularly resembled piracy and which did not—
an inquiry above and beyond the Sosa-mandated inquiry into whether 
modern offenses met other threshold criteria attributed to the original 
troika.60  
The Court embraced neither approach. Instead, it considered piracy, 
insofar as it contemplated extraterritorial claims, to be unrepresentative, at 
best licensing consideration of claims arising outside the United States . . . 
when they involved piracy.61 Addressing the ATS as a whole, rather than 
on an offense-by-offense basis, the Court concluded: “[T]he presumption 
against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS, and . . . nothing 
in the statute rebuts that presumption,” such that “petitioners’ case seeking 
relief for violations of the law of nations occurring outside the United 
States”—irrespective of their footing in the international law concerning 
extrajudicial killing, crimes against humanity, torture, arbitrary arrest and 
detention, and other wrongs—“is barred.”62 
As this implies, the Court took the extraordinary nature of the alleged 
offenses as lacking even ordinary weight in assessing whether Congress had 
overcome the presumption, just as their nature made no difference in 
whether the presumption would apply in the first place. If anything, oddly 
enough, their gravity backfired. The Court invoked the concern it felt 
animated the ATS, which was the avoidance of diplomatic strife, in arguing 
that providing extraterritorial causes of action could actually generate 
strife—or, at least, cause other “serious foreign policy consequences” of the 
kind animating the presumption against extraterritoriality, like emboldening 
other states to consider the liability of U.S. citizens for acts taken in the 
United States or anywhere.63 For the Court, aggressive interpretation of the 
ATS’s scope would make the United States a “uniquely hospitable 
forum,”64 but at the same time, dangerously subject to imitation by other 
                                                                                                                 
 59. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1666-67. 
 60. See Ralph G. Steinhardt, Determining Which Human Rights Claims “Touch and 
Concern” The United States: Justice Kennedy’s Filartiga, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1695, 
1697-99 (2014).   
 61. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1667 (“We do not think that the existence of a cause of action 
against them is a sufficient basis for concluding that other causes of action under the ATS 
reach conduct that does occur within the territory of another sovereign; pirates may well be a 
category unto themselves.”). 
 62. Id. at 1669. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1668. 
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states. This implicitly rejected the premise that universal jurisdiction was 
already established as an alternative that other states could embrace, but in 
any event suggested that U.S. courts should not welcome its arrival. 
III. Applying Non-Extraterritorial Statutes 
Since the ATS consists of one provision, and Kiobel found that the 
presumption against extraterritoriality was not overcome for that provision, 
all claims under it are constrained to one degree or another. The key for 
future cases is determining what remains—and it is here where the Court 
was least clear.  
A. The Requirement of Statutory “Focus” 
Part IV of the Court’s opinion provided: 
On these facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside the 
United States. And even where the claims touch and concern the 
territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient 
force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial 
application. Corporations are often present in many countries, 
and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence 
suffices. If Congress were to determine otherwise, a statute more 
specific than the ATS would be required.65 
For some, this mysterious paragraph returned much of what the rest of 
the opinion had taken. Claims in which “all the relevant conduct took place 
outside the United States,” and which corporate presence was the only link 
to the United States, were barred. In all other circumstances, however, 
claims might “touch and concern the territory of the United States” so as to 
admit U.S. jurisdiction.66  
What does it mean to “touch and concern the territory of the United 
States,” including with “sufficient force”?67 The separate opinions arguably 
spoke to the issue. Justice Kennedy, as previously noted, fanned hopes; his 
concurring opinion allowed that  
[o]ther cases may arise with allegations of serious violations of 
international law principles protecting persons, cases covered 
neither by the TVPA nor by the reasoning and holding of today's 
case; and in those disputes the proper implementation of the 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Id. at 1669 (citation omitted).  
 66. See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 10, at 20-26. 
 67. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.  
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presumption against extraterritorial application may require 
some further elaboration and explanation.68 
And what Kennedy put into doubt as to the presumption’s 
“implementation” might be elaborated by Justice Breyer’s concurrence in 
the judgment, which expressed the view that  
[t]he statute provides jurisdiction where (1) the alleged tort 
occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an American 
national, or (3) the defendant's conduct substantially and 
adversely affects an important American national interest, and 
that includes a distinct interest in preventing the United States 
from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal 
liability) for a torturer or other common enemy of mankind.69  
However, a much more restrictive gloss might be gleaned from Justice 
Alito’s concurrence, which expressed the view that “a putative ATS cause 
of action will fall within the scope of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality—and will therefore be barred—unless the domestic 
conduct is sufficient to violate an international law norm that satisfies 
Sosa’s requirements of definiteness and acceptance among civilized 
nations.”70 
These separate opinions reflect the views of seven members of the 
present Court. Even so, there are good reasons for discounting them, at least 
as anything easily reconciled with the majority opinion and with RJR 
Nabisco. Justice Kennedy’s opinion is provocatively noncommittal; it 
seems to reflect the view that the ATS does not overcome the presumption 
against extraterritoriality, but might have what some would view as 
extraterritorial application in the future.  To this extent, it sounded like an 
attempt to stamp the Court’s decision as “a restricted railroad ticket, good 
for this day and train only.”71 Justice Breyer, who concurred in the 
judgment only, got off the train a bit earlier.  He disagreed with the 
majority’s decision even to “invoke the presumption against 
extraterritoriality” in the first place—which naturally impairs the ability to 
reconcile his view with the implementation of it.72 And Justice Alito’s 
concurrence, for its part, elaborates what he described as a “broader 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 69. Id. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 70. Id. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 71. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 72. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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standard” supporting the majority’s application of the presumption to the 
case at hand, not an interpretation of the majority’s standard.73 It is 
challenging to translate the rest of what he wrote into an understanding of 
how the presumption should be applied, if applied it must be. 
It is more profitable to begin by clarifying the majority’s task in Part IV. 
Notwithstanding attempts to treat it as part of the overall opinion’s ebb and 
flow, or as a meaningless coda, the issue remaining for the Court was 
distinct and potentially significant. Having decided that the presumption 
against extraterritoriality was germane (notwithstanding the statute’s 
jurisdictional nature) and had not been overcome (notwithstanding, inter 
alia, piracy), it remained to determine whether the claims stated by the 
plaintiffs fell within the statute’s already-reckoned scope. This begat Part 
IV’s question: did the claims state a colorable connection to the United 
States, one with “sufficient force to displace the presumption against 
extraterritorial application”?74 A separate inquiry was warranted, as the 
portion of Morrison cited by Kiobel suggests, because the presumption is 
“often . . . not self-evidently dispositive,” as “its application requires further 
analysis.”75 In Morrison, as in Kiobel, the Court considered whether—
despite the fact that the statute in question did not apply extraterritorially—
it nonetheless applied to the facts alleged in that case because domestic 
activity had been alleged.76 The problem, often, is not just whether any 
domestic connection is evident, but also whether enough is; most cases of 
prohibited extraterritorial application involve some contact with U.S. 
territory, and “the presumption against extraterritorial application would be 
a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some 
domestic activity is involved.”77 In Morrison, the Court resolved that 
question by determining that because the “focus” of the Securities 
Exchange Act was “purchases and sales . . . in the United States,” rather 
than “the place where the deception originated,” facts of the latter sort were 
not sufficient.78 
Part IV of Kiobel strongly resembled this aspect of Morrison. To be sure, 
the Court’s phrasing was awkward. It is odd to say that the presumption is 
                                                                                                                 
 73. Id. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 74. Id. at 1669 (majority opinion) (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 
247, 266-73 (2010)).  
 75. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266.  
 76. Id. at 266-67. 
 77. Id. at 266. 
 78. Id. 
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“displace[d]” if there is sufficient activity79—the presumption remains, and 
limits the statute, but fails to foreclose the claim. It is also odd to put this in 
terms of whether the claims “touch and concern” U.S. territory, language 
more familiar from property servitudes.80 This led some courts applying 
Kiobel to question whether the Court adopted Morrison’s “focus” test, 
partly because of the Court’s unusual language, partly because of its brevity 
on the question, and partly because of problems posed by transposing a 
“focus” test to the ATS.81 Most courts, however, properly assumed 
continuity between the Court’s decisions.82 That assumption seems to have 
been vindicated by RJR Nabisco, which stated plainly that both Morrison 
and Kiobel contemplated a “focus” inquiry—the difference being that 
Kiobel did not require, on its facts, any resolution of what the ATS’s focus 
actually was, since there was nothing domestic about the allegations at all.83 
  
                                                                                                                 
 79. See Kiobel, 122 S. Ct. at 1669.  
 80. See Carlos M. Vázquez, Things We Do with Presumptions: Reflections on Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1719, 1741-47 (2014), for a close analysis. 
Professor Vázquez concludes that “displace” plausibly refers to the possibility of concluding 
that the presumption is wholly inapplicable, relying in large part on Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion; he acknowledges, however, that the majority opinion contained contrary 
indications, which in my view counsel decisively in the opposite direction—in part because 
Part IV, whatever its lack of clarity, is clearer yet than Justice Kennedy. Id. at 1747.  
 81. See, e.g., Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1028 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[Kiobel] 
did not explicitly adopt Morrison’s focus test, and chose to use the phrase ‘touch and 
concern’ rather than the term ‘focus’ when articulating the legal standard it did adopt. 
Moreover . . . the concurring opinions . . . note that the standard in [Kiobel] leaves ‘much 
unanswered.’ Additionally, since the focus test turns on discerning Congress’s intent when 
passing a statute, it cannot sensibly be applied to ATS claims, which are common law claims 
based on international legal norms” (citations omitted)). 
 82. See Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 788 F.3d 946, 952-54 (9th Cir. 2015) (Bea, J., 
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (stressing consistency of Kiobel with 
Morrison); Baloco v. Drummond Co., 767 F.3d 1229, 1236-37 (11th Cir. 2014) (treating 
Kiobel as consistent with “focus” test); Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 182-86 (2d 
Cir. 2014) (“Drawing upon the guidance provided by the Supreme Court in Morrison and 
Kiobel . . . a clear principle emerges for conducting the extraterritoriality-related 
jurisdictional analysis required by the ATS: that the ‘focus’ of the ATS is on conduct and on 
the location of that conduct.”). 
 83. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100-01 (2016). Post-RJR 
Nabisco attempts to suggest to the contrary—that is, to dispute whether the Supreme Court 
regards Kiobel as establishing a different test than Morrison, putting aside the merits of that 
position—seem to me indefensible. See, e.g., Reply Brief for the Cross-Petitioner at 7, 
Warfaa v. Ali, No. 15-1464 (U.S. July 19, 2016) (representing that “[a]s this Court 
acknowledged in RJR Nabisco, the Kiobel test is not the ‘focus’ test set forth in Morrison”). 
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B. Determining the “Focus” of the ATS  
The problem with Part IV lies less in discerning the question the Court 
was positing than in determining its method for answering it. In Morrison, 
the Court was evaluating activity both inside and outside the United 
States.84 But its test, particular to the Exchange Act, was derived from what 
the “focus” of the Act revealed about the focus of congressional concern—
which the Court thought centered on the purchase and sale of securities, 
rather than deceptive conduct, which was not punished save in tandem with 
such purchase and sale.85 Of course, one might say that the purchase and 
sale of securities was not punished absent deceptive conduct, which might 
lead one to focus instead on where the deception was conducted. But the 
path the Court chose had the virtue of entailing focal points with 
determinate geography (transactions in securities listed on domestic 
exchanges and, somewhat less concretely, domestic purchases and sales of 
other securities) that were regulated as such by the Act.86  
Neither Kiobel nor RJR Nabisco advanced the state of the art. In Kiobel, 
Part IV of the majority opinion supposed that future claims must “touch and 
concern the territory of the United States,” and that “it would reach too far 
to say that mere corporate presence suffices.”87 Other clues, including from 
the concurring opinions, are examined below, but RJR Nabisco (as just 
noted) thought that Kiobel did not actually reach the issue of the ATS’s 
focus.88 In RJR Nabisco itself, the Court found that much of RICO 
overcame the presumption against extraterritoriality, thus mooting the 
question of the statute’s “focus” with respect to those provisions.89 But the 
Court subjected the statutory private cause of action to a separate 
application of the presumption, which that provision did not overcome;90 
then, not wholly unlike Kiobel, the Court limited any “focus” inquiry 
because the plaintiffs had waived their claims for domestic injuries.91 For 
reasons the Court did not detail, it assumed that Congress had focused, as 
                                                                                                                 
 84. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 267-69 (2010).   
 85. Id. at 266-67. 
 86. Id. at 266-68. 
 87. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). 
 88. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.  
 89. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2103-04 (2016). 
 90. Id. at 2106-10.  
 91. Id. at 2011. 
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relevant for extraterritoriality purposes, on where the injury was suffered, as 
opposed to one of the other elements of the cause of action.92  
The difficulties posed by the “focus” inquiry for cases like Morrison and 
RJR Nabisco are redoubled for the ATS. That statute tells us only that 
Congress intended to create jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien 
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States.”93 Courtesy of Sosa, we also know that Congress 
contemplated judicial recognition of a “modest number” of claims, “based 
on the present-day law of nations,” that “rest on a norm of international 
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity 
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms” of which 
Congress must have been aware.94 If Congress had a “focus” in addressing 
such disparate and contingent matters, it is not easy to discern;95 the 
obvious breadth of the law of nations is compounded further when the 
disparate and contingent quality of U.S. treaties is thrown in the mix.   
Nevertheless, not unlike the quick turn to the place of injury in RJR 
Nabisco, Kiobel leaped to some conclusions. The first concerned the 
indispensability of territoriality, and conduct within a territory, as a 
component of focus.96 Naturally, some (perceived) extraterritorial reach is 
the predicate for raising the presumption against extraterritoriality in the 
first place. The problem to which the Court directed the parties was one in 
which “violations of the law of nations occur[ed] within the territory of a 
sovereign other than the United States”97 or, as it put the question more 
frequently, one of “extraterritorial application” of the ATS.98 Still more 
concretely, the Court characterized the presumption as being triggered by 
                                                                                                                 
 92. See id. at 2102-03. For discussion of the legitimacy of this assumption, see William 
S. Dodge, The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality in Two Steps, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 45, 
47-48 (2016); Carlos M. Vázquez, Out-Beale-ing Beale, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 68, 70-71 
(2016). 
 93. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
 94. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724-25 (2004). See also id. at 732 (alluding 
to “specific, universal, and obligatory” norms (quoting In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights 
Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994))). 
 95. See, e.g., Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1028 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 96. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).  
 97. Id. at 1663 (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) 
(Mem.)). 
 98. Id. at 1664, 1669. 
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“conduct occurring in the territory of a foreign sovereign,”99 and took it as a 
given that such conduct was what made the presumption relevant.100  
One might in principle distinguish between what triggers the 
germaneness of the presumption (so as to initiate the first step of the 
inquiry) from the statute’s “focus” for purposes of the doctrine’s second 
step. One might in particular resist the leap from concern about territoriality 
to concentrating on conduct within a territory, not least because—as the 
Court acknowledged in recognizing the distinctive posture of Kiobel—the 
ATS itself “does not directly regulate conduct.”101 But the Court considered 
elaboration of the statutory focus irrelevant because “all the relevant 
conduct took place outside the United States,”102 which presumed that the 
ATS’s “focus” was something requiring at least some degree of relevant 
conduct within the United States. Even Part IV’s choice of terms, however 
confusing in other respects, signaled—through both “displace” and “touch 
and concern,” concepts paying a neighborly visit from real property—the 
majority’s resolute focus on territory.103 At a minimum, nothing in Kiobel 
operated to disturb the emphatically territorial character of the focus inquiry 
as elaborated in other cases. In practical terms, the focus test as 
administered by the Court was really a locus test, and one in which conduct 
was key.104 
A related implication was that—unlike the sub-statutory examination of 
whether the presumption against extraterritoriality had been overcome, 
which apparently required distinguishing between piracy and other 
claims105—this “focus” inquiry was administered on a statutory basis, rather 
than with respect to a particular claim and its customary international law 
                                                                                                                 
 99. Id. at 1664. 
 100. Id. at 1665 (“conduct within the territory of another sovereign”); id. at 1666 
(“conduct in the territory of a foreign sovereign”); id. (“conduct in the territory of another 
sovereign”); id. at 1667 (“conduct occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of another 
sovereign”); id. (“conduct that does occur within the territory of another sovereign”); id. at 
1669 (“conduct occurring in the territory of another sovereign”). The Court also contrasted 
conduct within U.S. territory. Id. at 1666-67. 
 101. Id. at 1664. 
 102. Id. at 1669. 
 103. Id.  
 104. For similar readings by lower courts, see, e.g., Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, 
Inc., 845 F.3d 184, 197 (5th Cir. 2017) (stating that “the focus is on conduct that violates 
international law,” but emphasizing location); Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 185 
(2d Cir. 2014) (stating that, as applied to the ATS, a “focus” analysis entails “examining the 
conduct alleged to constitute violations of the law of nations, and the location of that 
conduct”).  
 105. See discussion supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text. 
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basis.106 The plaintiffs in Kiobel had seven different claims, at least three of 
which the district court had perceived might involve violations of the law of 
nations,107 but the Court did not distinguish among them, and each phase of 
its inquiry considered the ATS as a whole.108 Given the restrictive 
tendencies exhibited both in Kiobel and RJR Nabisco, one can envision the 
Court establishing some kind of additional hurdle that needed to be 
satisfied in the case of a particular kind of claim—say, accusing a foreign 
ally of the crime of aggression109—but there was little in Kiobel suggesting 
that a particular claim could be more easily rescued at the second step. 
The problems this poses are evident in the final substantive line of the 
majority opinion, which states, after alluding to “mere corporate presence” 
as lacking sufficient force, that “[i]f Congress were to determine otherwise, 
a statute more specific than the ATS would be required.”110 The difficulty, 
as the Court appreciated, is that the ATS not only lacked sufficient 
specificity to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality, but 
likewise lacked anything sufficiently specific to establish a particular 
“focus” for purposes of the second step.111 Absent contrary congressional 
instruction, the Court was disposed to view domestic conduct as its 
universal template for applying even those statutes bearing indirectly on 
conduct.  
C. Specific Components of ATS “Focus” 
Some post-Kiobel commentary speculated, not without reason, that 
future ATS actions might enjoy a different fate if the facts were just a bit 
different—that is, if the “foreign-cubed” facts in Kiobel were instead 
“foreign-squared,” with greater U.S. ties possible not solely through the 
conduct’s U.S. location, but also via the defendant’s nationality or perhaps 
even something about the plaintiff (who must, of course, remain an “alien” 
to recover under the ATS).112 That was certainly suggested by Justice 
                                                                                                                 
 106. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664, 1669.  
 107. Id. at 1663. 
 108. See id. at 1663, 1665, 1669. Justice Kennedy may well not have shared this 
assumption, but he did not elaborate. Id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).   
 109. This would be in addition to the “limiting principles” like “exhaustion, forum non 
conveniens, and comity” on which Justice Breyer would depend. Id. at 1674 (Breyer, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
 110. Id. at 1669 (majority opinion). 
 111. See id. 
 112. See, e.g., Oona Hathaway, Kiobel Commentary: The Door Remains Open to 
“Foreign Squared” Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2013, 4:27 PM), http:// www.scotus 
blog.com/2013/04/Kiobel-commentary-the-door-remains-open-to-foreign-squared-cases/ 
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Breyer’s opinion, which would have opened inquiry into a wider array of 
considerations;113 Justice Alito’s approach, on the other hand, would 
disregard variations on the facts not relating to the place of conduct.114 
Although more detailed, the Court’s “focus” analysis in Morrison and RJR 
Nabisco was not entirely straightforward, so one must proceed with caution. 
Nevertheless, several types of claims might survive truncation of the ATS, 
and they can be assessed from most plausible to least. 
1. Claim-Related Conduct in the United States (and Elsewhere) 
Although the Court did not formally address the ATS’s “focus” for step 
two purposes, there are plenty of indications—the Court’s predicate for 
raising the issue of extraterritoriality, discussions of the presumption in 
Kiobel and other cases, and the opening of Part IV—that “relevant conduct” 
within the United States may establish a claim under the ATS.115 The 
extremes are easy enough to address. If all the relevant conduct was within 
the United States, the issue of extraterritoriality would not even arise; if 
none was within the United States, Part IV suggests that the claim is a non-
starter. The question is what degree of conduct within the United States 
might, at least if combined with some other factor (or a complement of 
conduct outside the United States), establish an ATS claim. 
Justice Alito answered that the U.S. conduct must itself be sufficient to 
establish a claim under the ATS, making any conduct outside the United 
States essentially irrelevant to the inquiry.116 That approach has attracted 
support in the lower courts, at least in the Second Circuit,117 but it has 
                                                                                                                 
(“‘Foreign cubed’ cases . . . are off the table. But there may remain significant scope for 
‘foreign squared’ cases—cases in which the plaintiff or defendant is a U.S. national or where 
the harm occurred on U.S. soil.”). 
 113. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1673-74, 1677 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 114. See id. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 115. Id. at 1669. 
 116. Id. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[A] putative ATS cause of action will fall within 
the scope of the presumption against extraterritoriality—and will therefore be barred—
unless the domestic conduct is sufficient to violate an international law norm that satisfies 
Sosa's requirements of definiteness and acceptance among civilized nations.”). 
 117. The leading example is the Second Circuit’s decision in Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 
770 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2014). There, Judge Cabranes stated—in elaborating a two-step test 
that seemed to begin its step one, confusingly, with step two of the extraterritoriality test 
indicated  in RJR Nabisco—that 
the complaint must plead: (1) conduct of the defendant that “touch[ed] and 
concern[ed]” the United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption 
against extraterritoriality, and (2) that the same conduct, upon preliminary 
examination, states a claim for a violation of the law of nations or aiding and 
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pronounced difficulties. Morrison addressed a case in which the plaintiffs 
stressed that deceptive conduct, a key part of their claim, was stateside;118 
while the Court instead focused on the location of the transactions with 
which that conduct was associated, it did not suggest that facts like those 
the plaintiffs emphasized were also necessary, such that everything had to 
take place within the United States. As to Kiobel, as previously noted, 
Justice Alito did not purport to be translating the majority’s approach, but 
rather establishing his own standard;119 only Justice Thomas joined him, so 
three justices joining the majority opinion (Chief Justice Roberts, Justice 
Kennedy, and the late Justice Scalia) eschewed his approach.  
On its merits, moreover, Justice Alito’s approach is dubious. It is 
completely tenable, even in a globalized economy, to assume that Congress 
would sometimes expect a statute to apply only to torts that were entirely 
home-grown. But that seems less likely for the ATS, where Justice Alito’s 
approach would not only avoid foreign territory, but also subvert piracy 
policy, given the indispensability of the high seas to such claims. Even if it 
is too much to allow piracy claims to overcome the presumption against 
extraterritoriality for all ATS claims, it seems a substantial step further to 
suggest that those claims or their analogs are excluded altogether from the 
scope of the statute. 
It’s coming up with an alternative that is hard. For anything short of 
Justice Alito’s approach, the challenge lies in reckoning the appropriate 
amount of relevant conduct that would be sufficient, if sufficiency is to be 
something short of complete sufficiency for purposes of stating a claim 
satisfying Sosa. Perhaps “extensive ‘relevant conduct’ in United States 
territory” is enough,120 or perhaps the relevant conduct must be alleged “to 
a degree necessary to overcome the presumption”;121 perhaps just “enough” 
relevant conduct is enough.122 Morrison, however, found that a similar 
approach (“significant and material conduct,” proposed by the Solicitor 
                                                                                                                 
abetting another's violation of the law of nations. 
Id. at 187 (alterations in original); see id. at 182 (explaining that “[a]n evaluation of the 
presumption's application to a particular case is essentially an inquiry into whether the 
domestic contacts are sufficient to avoid triggering the presumption at all”); accord Licci By 
Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL,  834 F.3d 201, 215 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing Mastafa, 
770 F.3d at 186); Balintulo v. Ford Motor Co., 796 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2015) (same). 
 118. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266-67 (2010). 
 119. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669-70 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 120. Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 528 (4th Cir. 2014). Accord 
Warfaa v. Ali, 811 F.3d 653, 659 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 121. Baloco v. Drummond Co., 767 F.3d 1229, 1239 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 122. Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 597 (11th Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original). 
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General) was insufficiently premised in the statute at issue; the Court also 
expressed a countervailing concern about developing the United States as a 
locus for foreign-concerned litigation, one echoed in both Sosa and 
Kiobel.123 Or perhaps one might ask whether the “last event necessary to 
make an actor liable” took place, though that has more than its share of 
problems.124 
It may be helpful to look at the particular claims to determine more 
exactly the nature of the conduct that is relevant, as several lower courts 
have done.125 In the end, however, it is hard to see how that avoids the 
underlying problem, in that it still requires assessing whether “location of 
the [relevant conduct] alleged in general terms . . . outweigh[s] the 
extraterritorial location of the rest of Plaintiffs' claims”—or loosely 
affiliated inquiries into whether the “allegations of domestic conduct” are 
“extensive or specific” enough.126 As discussed below, moreover, it is 
doubtful that any ATS claim can ever, by virtue of its nature, be 
substantially disassociated from U.S. territory. 
This basic conundrum—deciding how much is enough—admits of no 
easy answers, other than Justice Alito’s, but the severity of its result can 
certainly be ameliorated. For example, it may be possible to expand slightly 
Congress’s supposed focus on conduct within the United States to 
encompass conduct outside the United States but not within foreign states—
as with ordinary claims of piracy. Post-Kiobel cases have suggested that 
piracy constitutes an exception to its analysis, or perhaps an instance in 
which the presumption is overcome,127 relying on language in Kiobel 
suggesting that piracy could not be extrapolated to the other matters128 and 
                                                                                                                 
 123. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 270-72. 
 124. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (AM. LAW INST. 1934); see 
Vazquez, supra note 80, at 1739-40 (discussing the first Restatement’s compatibility with 
Morrison). The first Restatement was not followed in this regard by the Restatement 
(Second), nor is it likely to be followed by the Restatement Third. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF CONFLICT OF LAW § 5.01 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 2, 2016). 
 125. See Drummond, 782 F.3d at 597-99; Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 182-
83, 185, 195 (2d Cir. 2014); Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 591-92 (9th Cir. 2014); 
Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 528-29.  
 126. Drummond, 782 F.3d at 598. 
 127. See, e.g., Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc., 153 F. 
Supp. 3d 1291, 1303-04, 1304 n.14 (W.D. Wash. 2015). 
 128. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1667 (2013) (“We do not 
think that the existence of a cause of action against [pirates] is a sufficient basis for 
concluding that other causes of action under the ATS reach conduct that does occur within 
the territory of another sovereign; pirates may well be a category unto themselves.”). 
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distinguishing the prudential considerations.129 Alternatively, it might bear 
on whether Congress’s focus—at the second, subsequent step, one only 
gestured at in Part IV—was both on conduct within the United States and 
conduct not within the territory of other states, which would enable 
appropriate claims relating to piracy and other offenses.130 There would 
remain, however, a place for territoriality, mixed with contra-territoriality, 
and a need for clearer standards concerning when too much conduct 
elsewhere—be that outside the United States, or within a foreign state’s 
territory—tips the scales against.  
2. Party Status: Nationality, Residence, and Domicile 
Perhaps due to uncertainty about the quantum of domestic conduct 
required, lower courts have also cited facts about the parties—such as U.S. 
nationality of the defendant, or its domicile or residency in the United 
States—as bearing on whether the claims “touch and concern” the United 
States or, alternatively, bear on the “focus” of the ATS.131 Other decisions 
have rejected the relevance of such facts,132 or more broadly, rejected the 
                                                                                                                 
 129. Id. (explaining that high seas are “beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States or any other country,” and thus “[a]pplying U.S. law to pirates . . . does not typically 
impose the sovereign will of the United States onto conduct occurring within the territorial 
jurisdiction of another sovereign.”). 
 130. See, e.g., Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 2015 WL 3745641, at *3 (D. 
Alaska June 12, 2015) (applying the piracy “exception” to “intentional tortious interference 
with maritime navigation, trespass and trespass to chattels, private nuisance, and civil 
conspiracy deriving from each of the other three claims”). 
 131. See, e.g., Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 594 (9th Cir. 2014) (“It may well 
be . . . that a defendant's U.S. citizenship or corporate status is one factor that, in conjunction 
with other factors, can establish a sufficient connection between an ATS claim and the 
territory of the United States to satisfy Kiobel.”); Drummond, 782 F.3d at 595-96 (finding 
“citizenship or corporate status of the defendant[]” relevant to the “touch and concern 
inquiry”). Drummond like most or all of these decisions, took the view that “it would reach 
too far to find that the only relevant factor is where the conduct occurred, particularly the 
underlying conduct,” id. at 593 n.24, but at the same time, found that U.S. citizenship of the 
defendants—while relevant—was “insufficient to permit jurisdiction on its own,” id. at 596. 
See also Doe I v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 01-1357(RCL), 2015 WL 5042118, at *7 (D.D.C. 
July 6, 2015) (holding corporate citizenship alone was not enough for ATS jurisdiction); 
Ahmed v. Magan, No. 2:10-cv-00342, 2013 WL 4479077, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2013); 
Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 321-24 (D. Mass. 2013).  
 132. See, e.g., Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 182-89 (2d Cir. 2014) (stating 
that “[w]e disagree with the contention that a defendant's U.S. citizenship has any relevance 
to the jurisdictional analysis”); see also Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 845 F.3d 
184, 209 (5th Cir. 2017) (Graves, J., dissenting) (surmising from the majority’s failure to 
mention a defendant’s status as a U.S. corporation that it found nationality and related status 
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relevance of anything other than the location of the conduct—if all the 
conduct occurred abroad.133  
There are conflicting signals from the opinions in Kiobel. Those inclined 
to view the defendant’s nature as significant can cite the majority’s 
dismissal of “mere corporate presence;”134 this may be read as suggesting 
that the presence of other entities might matter, or that corporate presence, 
coupled with some other territorial indicator, would not only “touch and 
concern” the United States but do so with “sufficient force.” A defendant’s 
links to the United States might also be considered to augment the 
legitimate regulatory interests of the United States and, to a degree, reduce 
the likelihood of foreign objection. Justice Breyer’s concurrence in the 
judgment, at least, described a defendant’s status as an American national 
as highly salient.135  
Still, the difficulties with such actor-specific factors are easy to 
anticipate. For one, Part IV of the opinion, which briefly mentions 
corporate presence as part of a hurried coda, is a flimsy basis for 
extrapolating the majority’s interest in such considerations. Earlier in the 
opinion, the Court noted that Attorney General Bradford’s opinion 
addressed conduct by U.S. citizens without suggesting that citizenship (or 
residence) might be enough,136 and instead the Court harped on the location 
of conduct.137 Subsequently, in RJR Nabisco, the Court rejected the 
defendant’s arguments that the RICO statute should apply only to domestic 
enterprises because that “would lead to difficult line-drawing and 
counterintuitive results”; this was largely because it would be divorced 
from conduct, but also because there was no indication that Congress had 
                                                                                                                 
factors irrelevant, and signaling disagreement); Warfaa v. Ali, 811 F.3d 653, 660-61 (4th 
Cir. 2016) (noting, on the one hand, that “[n]othing in this case involved U.S. citizens, the 
U.S. government, U.S. entities, or events in the United States,” but also suggesting that 
“[m]ere happenstance of residency”—on the facts of that case, an “after-acquired residence 
in the United States long after the alleged events of abuse”—“lacking any connection to the 
relevant conduct, is not a cognizable consideration in the ATS context”).  
 133. Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 190-92 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[I]f all the relevant 
conduct occurred abroad, that is simply the end of the matter under Kiobel.”). 
 134. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).  
 135. Id. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (asserting “that the statute 
provides jurisdiction where,” inter alia, “the defendant is an American national”). 
 136. Id. at 1667-68 (majority opinion). 
 137. Id. at 1662, 1664, 1665 (focusing on “conduct occurring in the territory of a foreign 
sovereign”).  
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taken on the imponderables of deciding based on the location of an entity 
rather than on location of conduct.138  
In neither instance was the Court undertaking a “focus” analysis, but 
rather addressing the prior question of whether the presumption had been 
overcome, so its observations were not completely apposite. Unfortunately, 
neither was Justice Breyer’s opposing instinct to credit nationality.139 His 
point was entirely fair: a defendant’s nationality, at least if it were material 
to Congress, might reinforce an inference that the statute was not delimited 
on another, territorial basis.140 However, that reasoning drove him to 
conclude that ATS overcame any presumption against extraterritoriality—
which, if stare decisis holds, is more difficult to claw back than anything in 
Part IV. 
In contrast, the majority’s lack of interest in party status seems to be a 
continuous thread connecting the first and second steps of its inquiry;141 if 
the statute were conceded to be only territorial in scope, as the majority 
would have it, it is not clear that any of the opinions in Kiobel would regard 
an actor’s status as decisive. Even the non-determinative salience of such 
status, independent of its territorial character, may be doubted. Part IV 
appeared to concede the potential relevance of “corporate presence” to ATS 
“focus,”142 but presence in the United States—even if it is not necessarily 
exclusive, as the Court noted critically—steps as much toward territoriality 
as it does toward American nationality.  
If and to the extent party status is separate from territoriality, familiar 
problems arise. If such status is not in itself a sufficient condition, its 
significance—when it must be melded with an indeterminate amount of 
U.S. conduct—remains indeterminate. It seems unlikely, at bottom, that 
such status relieves plaintiffs of the burden of showing a substantial 
quantum of territorial conduct, perhaps such as might by itself convince a 
sympathetic court that the presumption was satisfied.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 138. See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2103-05 (2016). 
 139. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).   
 140. Cf. id. at 1674-77 (citing U.S., international, and foreign examples differentiating 
claimants and defendants on the basis of nationality). Likewise, at least, in principle, a 
statute might overcome the presumption by indicating that it was relevant to aliens (though it 
would be helpful if it were oriented toward global problems, or added “everywhere”). 
 141. See id. at 1668-69 (majority opinion).   
 142. See id. at 1669.   
48 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:23 
 
 
3. Other Interests 
Beyond the tort’s commission on American soil and the American 
nationality of the defendant, Justice Breyer would have found jurisdiction—
seemingly on an independent basis—where “the defendant's conduct 
substantially and adversely affects an important American national interest, 
and that includes a distinct interest in preventing the United States from 
becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a 
torturer or other common enemy of mankind.”143 That approach obviously 
spoke to Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan; although Justice 
Kennedy did not join, it is not hard to see its appeal to him, given the 
reservations indicated in his concurrence.144 
In elaborating, Justice Breyer made clear that an “important American 
national interest” could redeem jurisdiction “only where distinct American 
interests are at issue.”145 He made his meaning slightly plainer in discussing 
the harboring of defendants, his leading example.146 While Justice Breyer 
agreed, seemingly, with Justice Story (and the majority) that the United 
States should not aspire to be “the custos morum of the whole world,”147 he 
felt that permitting jurisdiction when the modern-day equivalent of pirates 
were present within the territory was consistent with a narrower, 
differentiated role.148  
The reasoning remained hard to reconcile with what the Court had 
communicated about the statute’s focus. Certainly, longstanding 
international norms discouraged or even made illegal the harboring of 
pirates,149 and U.S. cases had found ATS liability in instances where other 
kinds of defendants were later found in the United States.150 Those 
propositions were not, however, necessarily related. Harboring piracy’s 
modern equivalents might be considered distinctive if it were wrongful for 
the United States not to proceed against such defendants, but there was no 
                                                                                                                 
 143. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671, 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 144. See id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).   
 145. Id. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added). 
 146. See id.  
 147. Id. (quoting United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 847 (C.C.D. Mass. 
1822) (No. 15,551)). The majority also quoted Justice Story, but added that “there is no 
indication that the ATS was passed to make the United States a uniquely hospitable forum 
for the enforcement of international norms.” Id. at 1668 (majority opinion).  
 148. See id. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 149. Id.  
 150. See id. at 1675 (citing Filartiga v. Pena–Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878-79 (2d Cir. 1980), 
and In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1469, 1475 (9th Cir. 
1994)). 
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attempt to show a degree of acceptance and specificity such as would 
satisfy Sosa.151 It is also unclear how Congress could be focused, in 
legislating against torts in violation of the law of nations, on redressing 
circumstances relating to a defendant’s presence that might materialize only 
after the original torts were committed.152 A harboring factor would have 
only a tenuous relationship to the focus of the underlying statute, unless 
another actionable tort may be layered on—meaning that harboring would 
satisfy the presumption only to the extent that such a tort did, indeed, arise 
out of domestic conduct, being principally that of U.S. actors affording the 
wrongdoer repose. 
On another reading, harboring did less work, simply illustrating 
circumstances in which international law acknowledged U.S. capacity 
(rather than obligation) to proceed. A similar claim was made for U.S. 
jurisdiction over its nationals, where Justice Breyer asserted not only that 
“[n]ations have long been obliged not to provide safe harbors for their own 
nationals who commit such serious crimes abroad,” but also that “[m]any 
countries permit foreign plaintiffs to bring suits . . . based on unlawful 
conduct that took place abroad.”153 Unfortunately, that too seems 
fundamentally incompatible with the majority’s approach. Per Chief Justice 
Roberts, the issue was not whether the United States had a plausible basis in 
international law for regulating the conduct, whether based on universality, 
nationality, or some other ground—including an effects-oriented form of 
territoriality that might be considerably broader than anything Congress 
might envision. International impermissibility was not the predicate for 
invoking the presumption against extraterritoriality, and in evaluating 
whether it had been overcome, the Court likewise evidenced no concern for 
the latitude afforded Congress by international law.154 If anything, the 
                                                                                                                 
 151. It may prove difficult, in fact, to distinguish a defendant’s presence in the United 
States, as a “happenstance,” from a purposeful attempt to seek safe haven. In Warfaa v. Ali, 
Judge Gregory reached a different conclusion than the majority, noting that the case 
involved “a natural person who has sought safe haven” and that the defendant’s “after-
acquired residence” in the United States was distinguished from a “mere ‘happenstance.’” 
811 F. 3d 653, 663-64 (4th Cir. 2016) (Gregory, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(citing to additional facts not solely based on the location of the injuries sustained). Whether 
a purposeful attempt to seek haven would then translate into “harboring” by the state itself is 
yet another matter. 
 152. Cf. id. at 661 (majority opinion) (noting “after-acquired residence in the United 
States long after the alleged events of abuse”). 
 153. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1675 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 154. See id. at 1668-69 (majority opinion). If anything, Morrison relied more heavily on 
this. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 267 (2010) (protesting that “[w]e 
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evidence suggested its irrelevance. In acknowledging that Congress “can 
indicate that it intends federal law to apply to conduct occurring abroad,” 
the Court cited the example of genocide, a crime unambiguously 
condemned under international law and subject to universal jurisdiction; 
even there, the Court held the statute up as an example because it applied 
(explicitly) where the alleged offender was, inter alia, “present in the 
United States,” and governed “regardless of where the offense is 
committed,” not because of anything directly relating to international 
obligations.155 The ATS provides, by comparison, little evidence that might 
have persuaded the majority and little grounds for confidence that the Court 
would reverse course were the issue presented as one of statutory focus. 
Most fundamentally, Justice Breyer’s interest in identifying “where 
distinct American interests are at issue”156 was antithetical to the majority’s 
conception of the appropriate role for courts. For Chief Justice Roberts, that 
issue was joined far before “focus.”157 Congress, in the majority’s view, 
was the body entrusted with and capable of determining whether there was 
an unwanted clash with other nations;158 its subsequent discussion of the 
inherent dangers that U.S. courts supposedly posed was not, for all intents 
and purposes, rebuttable at all, even where they might in fact be shown to 
serve a distinctive U.S. interest.159 While the Court remained concerned 
about making the United States a “uniquely hospitable forum” for norms 
that any state could adopt and enforce, it was not, similarly, open to the 
reply that such a unique role might be appropriate, or even that its 
opportunity to afford an appropriate forum was, if anything, the unique 
feature.160  
Compatibility with the majority aside, Justice Breyer’s pursuit of 
“distinct American interests” contains its own contradictions. His view, 
recall, was that the location of the tort, the defendant’s nationality, or the 
relation between the defendant’s conduct and an important American 
                                                                                                                 
know of no one . . . who even believed that under established principles of international law 
Congress had the power” to regulate foreign securities exchanges). 
 155. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1091(e) (2006 ed., Supp. V)). 
 156. Id. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).   
 157. See id. at 1664-65 (majority opinion).   
 158. Id. at 1664 (citing Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 
(1957)). 
 159. See id. at 1664-65. Cf. RJR Nabisco v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 
(2016) (stating that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies “across the board, 
‘regardless of whether there is a risk of conflict between the American statute and a foreign 
law’”) (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)). 
 160. Id. at 1668. 
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national interest (like avoiding harboring) could each establish American 
jurisdiction.161 Presumably the same goes for other jurisdictions as well.  
But if jurisdiction could in principle be exercised by the state where the 
conduct occurred, the state of the defendant’s nationality, and the United 
States as the defendant’s ultimate location, the distinctiveness of U.S. 
interests surely wanes, and the risk of regulatory clashes that troubled the 
Court seem more substantial.162 
IV. Conclusion 
Although the application to the ATS of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality arose suddenly in Kiobel—an iceberg materializing before 
Lohengrin’s swan-pulled boat163—it is of lasting consequence for the 
statute’s scope, unless rethought. This rethinking might take the form of a 
reconceptualization, in which the relevance of the presumption, or whether 
it was overcome, or whether the statute’s focus may be reckoned by 
unexpected means, is somehow refashioned.  Such opportunity is always 
available to a court of last resort, though RJR Nabisco made such a move 
more difficult. 
Perhaps such rethinking may be emboldened, eventually, by the idea that 
statutory stare decisis loses force when it concerns a new constraint on a 
statute that is over 200 years old. The first Congress could not, certainly, 
have anticipated the nature of modern statutory presumptions; even if 
confined by a presumption to U.S. territory, the scope of that authority and 
its relation to the rest of the world—today’s “here” and “there”—would 
likely have amazed it.  For the time being, however, the Court’s conception 
of the presumption against extraterritoriality, together with its notion of 
territoriality, has assumed a place in U.S. doctrine, and must be properly 
understood before any eviction can begin. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 161. Id. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).   
 162. See id. at 1669 (majority opinion). 
 163. The well-known metaphor is Judge Friendly’s, likening the ATS’s own sudden 
appearance to Wagner’s mysterious knight.  See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 
(2d Cir.1975); see also Velez v. Sanchez, 754 F.Supp.2d 488, 495-96 & n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(detailing Lohengrin’s arrival), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 693 F.3d 308 (2d Cir. 
2012).  
